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Torts-DAMAGE SUITS AGAINST PHARMACISTS AND PHYSICIANS BASED
ON NEGLIGENCE IN BIRTH CONTROL TREATMENTS. Troppi v. Scarf,
187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1971)
Birth control information and methods have become available as
a matter of right to wide segments of the American public. Birth con-
trol has played an important role in the policies espoused by leaders of
causes ranging from the trimming of welfare roles to uninhibited sexual
freedom. The utility of birth control in achieving these goals, and
indeed the very desirability of the goals themselves, present legislative
questions which in some instances cannot be resolved by governmental
fiat. But birth control is, in its essence, not a tool of social policy, but
a m'edical function. The law recognizes that medical functions im-
properly performed can lead to liability on the part of the medical
personnel involved. This legal principle becomes overwhelmingly com-
plex when the medical function for which redress is sought is a birth
control method improperly executed.
In a birth control suit, where the plaintiff seeks damages for the birth
of an unwanted child, the abstract principles governing medical mal-
practice conflict with policy considerations concerning the availability
of a remedy in the event of the birth of a normal child. To date it
appears that public policy has largely controlled the issue of the exist-
ence of a remedy A line of recent cases, exemplified by Troppi v.
Scarf,' suggests that a watershed may have been reached in this area,
and that legal principles may in the future have a significant impact
on the shaping of public policy
The Troppi plaintiffs had seven children when the plaintiff wife
suffered a miscarriage which prompted her to seek birth control ad-
vice. Plaintiff's physician prescribed an oral contraceptive and tele-
phoned the prescription to the defendant, a licensed pharmacist. In-
stead of correctly filling the prescription, the defendant pharmacist
supplied a mild tranquilizer. Mrs. Troppi subsequently became preg-
nant and delivered a normal child, her eighth. Plaintiffs sued for dam-
ages including medical expenses, lost wages, pain and suffering, anxiety,
and the expenses necessary to rear and educate the child.
At trial a summary judgment was entered for the defendant on the
theory that whatever damage plaintiffs suffered was more than offset
by the benefit of having a normal child. The trial court relied upon
a "public policy" against suits based upon the birth of a normal child,
1. 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1971).
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and said that damages would be impossible to determine due to..the
necessity of evaluating, as a setoff, the benefits of parenthood. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the assessment of damages is
within the competency of the trier of fact, and indicating that the
element of uncertainty in the net recovery does not render the damage
question unduly speculative.2 Thus the appellate court recognized that
while public policy demands a recognition of the benefits of normal
childbirth, this policy cannot be advanced to negate totally recovery
in the form of a summary judgment. In other words, the jury must
determine damages, giving recognition to normal childbirth as a setoff.
Thus evidence of normal childbirth cannot be used to justify per se
a directed verdict. The jury must, after hearing the evidence, weigh
this benefit against the hardships in each particular case.
In filling prescriptions a druggist is required to use that high degree
of care which a very prudent and cautious person would exercise.3
The case of a druggist erroneously filling a prescription for a contra-
ceptive bears a close resemblance to the case of a physician failing to
perform successfully a sterilization procedure 4  Yet different results
have been reached in these apparently analogous cases.
The motive of the patient in both cases is to prevent subsequent
pregnancies, and the result in each is the birth of a child. In each
instance the paramount issue is not the establishment of liability on
the part of the physician or pharmacist,5 but rather whether the birth
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Tucker v. Graves, 17 Ala. App. 602, 88 So. 40 (1920); Thomsen v.
Rexall Drug & Chem. Co, 45 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1965), where the court held that if it
could be shown that the druggist's erroneous filling of the prescription was the prom-
mate cause of the injury, then the druggist could be held liable on a negligence
theory. Fuchs v. Barber, 140 Kan. 373, 36 P.2d 962 (1934); Trumbatun v. Katz &
Besthoff,. 180 La. 915, 158 So. 16 (1934); Krueger v. Knutson, 261 Minn. 124, 111
N.W.2d 526 (1961); Boudot v. Schavallie, 178 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1961); Burke v. Bean,
363 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. 1962), in which the court reasoned that the general customer
has no definite knowledge concerning many medicines, and must rely implicitly upon
the druggist who holds himself out as one having a peculiar learning and skill to
fill prescriptions. For this reason the court held that the druggist owes to us cus-
tomers the highest degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and vigilance so that human
life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of a
harmful drug for a beneficial drug ordered by the customer's physician.
4. In Boudot v. Schavallie, 178 NE.2d 599 (Ohio 1961), a physician prescribed a
certain shampoo, but the pharmacist negligently supplied a different one, causing
injury to the plaintiff. The court held that a pharmacist stands in the same position as
any other medical specialist.
5. The establishment of liability on the part of the physician or pharmacist has
not been seriously challenged in these cases. The failure of the physician to sterilize
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of a normal child is such a benefit as to outweigh, as a matter of law,
any coincident damages. Family planning, including the use of contra-
cepuvesO and sterilization,7 is not violative of any extant public policy,
and should not be allowed to preclude the recovery of damages.8
The damages suffered by the parents can be clearly identified. They
include the cost of the prescription or sterilization procedure, pam and
suffering, anxiety, lost wages, the cost of medical care, and the cost of
rearing the child? The primary question remains whether these dam-
ages are recoverable.
Where defendant's tortious conduct extends a "benefit" to the plain-
tiff, as well as causes him injury, the value of the benefit will custo-
marily be weighed against the injury m order to compute damages. 10
This principle was recognized m an early case involving improper birth
control technique, yet it was held that the birth of a normal child con-
successfully his patient, or of the pharmacist to fill correctly a prescription for a
contraceptive is clearly the proximate cause of the birth of the child. An argument
has been made that the sexual relations between the plaintiffs in these cases constitute
an independent intervening cause thereby relieving the defendant of liability. The
general test of whether an independent intervening act, which actively operates
to produce an injury, breaks the chain of causation is the foreseeability of that act.
Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). If the act is
foreseeable, then it does not break the chain of causation. Gill v. Epstein, 62 Cal. 2d
611, 44 Cal. Rptr. 45, 401 P.2d 397 (1965). At least ui the case of married couples,
it is foreseeable that the couple will have sexual relations and the intervening cause
argument has been rejected. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr.
463 (1967).
6. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has promulgated several in-
formative pamphlets dealing with this subject. Family Planning: One Aspect of Free-
dom to Choose, reprinted from H.E.W Indicators (June 1966); One Local Welfare
Agency's Approach (1966); Report on Family Planning (Sept. 1966); White-Non-White
Differences in Family Planning in the U. S, reprinted from H.E.W Indicators (Feb.
1966).
7. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967);
Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1967); Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn.
123, 255 N.W 620 (1934).
8. Id.
9. Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F Supp. 460 (S.D. W Va. 1967); Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616
(Del. Super. 1971); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1967); Troppi v. Scarf, 187
N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1971); Ball v Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
10. REsTATEmENT oF TORTS § 920 (1939)"
Where the defendant's tornous conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff
or to his property and in doing so has conferred upon the plaintiff a special
benefit to the interest which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred
is considered in mitigation of the damages, where this is equitable.
See, e.g., Northwest Oil Co. v. Haslett Warehouse Co., 168 Or. 570, 123 P.2d 985
(1942); Meier v. Portland Cable Ry, 16 Or. 500, 19 P 610 (1888). "1,
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fers such a benefit on the parents as to outweigh, as a matter of law, any
damages that may have been suffered."
That ruling was nothing more than a judicial expression of what the
court perceived to be the prevailing public sentiment. The homage
paid to public perception of the issue was expressly acknowledged m
Shabeen v. Krngbt,'2 where a medical function, sterilization, was im-
properly performed, but no damages were awarded. This case dra-
matically illustrates the subservience of a rule of law to prevailing
social ethic. It was a classic case of a wrong without a remedy, since
the "wrong" was actually a "right" according to admittedly extra-
judicial, but nevertheless prevailing standards.'3
As pointed out earlier, however, the public perception of birth con-
trol has changed. With that changing perception has come a judicial
recognition of a right not to bear children, the invasion of which is
not offset by the assumed benefits of parenthood. The first case to
allow recovery, Custodio v. Bauer,'4 adopted a purely economic ap-
proach and rejected an inquiry into the benefit attributable to the birth
of a child. The court based its determination that a compensable loss
existed on the fact that the mother would have to spread her society,
comfort, care, protection, and support over a larger group. 5 The
compensation was awarded in order to replenish the family 'exchequer so
that the new arrival would not deprive the other members of the family
of what had been previously planned as their just share of the family
income, and evaluation of the social benefit to the family of an addi-
tional member was precluded.'
11. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W 620 (1934).
12. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957). The Shaheen court disrmssed a suit seeking damages
for the cost of reanng a child. Expressing a belief that the allowance of damages for
the normal birth of a normal child is foreign to the universal public sentiment, the
court determined that any imposition of damages would be an anomolous result:
The physician would pay for the pleasure derived by plaintiffs in rearing and educating
the child.
13. The Sbabeen court concluded that many people would have been willing to
support the child if given custody Therefore, the court reasoned that since plaintiffs
wished to keep the child, they should be required to provide support. Shaheen v.
Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 44 (1957). The rationale appears ludicrous. Of course
the child was unwanted before conception, a fact ignored by the court. Presumably,
the only avenue for recovery by the parents is a threat to abandon the child or a
simple refusal to care for it. In this case the damages recovered are really a form
of blackmail, where for an appropriate price the parents agree to keep and raise
the. child, thereby relieving the state from the potential burden of an additional ward.
14. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
15. 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
16. 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77
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By basing damage computation on an economic evaluation and by
viewing recovery as a replenishment of family funds, The Custodio
court apparently rejects the benefit theory of the Restatement17 The
Custodio court reasons that the pocketbook is to be made whole, not
the parents, and therefore the benefit theory has no application since
the pocketbook receives no benefit from the child.
The Custodio approach is a commendable departure from the stone
age jurisprudence of Shaheen in that it goes beyond the Restatement.
It assures compensation to the parents of an unwanted child by pro-
hibiting the fact finder from considering any benefit from the child's
presence as a factor in diminution of damages. Yet it is this last element
that is Custodio's fatal flaw for it fails to take cognizance of reality
An unwanted infant is not like a damaged fender, which can be
fixed for a certain sum of money That an individual has the right to
be childless is not widely questioned; but the value of that right is not
capable of objective measurement. The damage suffered when an
unwanted child is born depends in large measure on the human relation-
ship formed between the reluctant parents and the infant. The nature
of that relationship depends in large measure on who the parents are.
Custodio, in its effort to overcome the traditional, public-sentiment-
based rule against compensation for the birth of a normal though un-
wanted child, has cast the rule of compensation so rigidly as to dis-
count these critical elements of the damage inquiry
Tropp v. Scarf, and the Delaware decision in Coleman v. Garrison,&
appear not to go so far toward compensation as Custodio These two
cases retain the Restatement-based benefit theory of damages. They
stand only for the proposition that it is error to conclude as a matter
of law that the benefit from the birth of a normal child outweighs the
damage. This view is superior to Custodio in recognizing the necessity
of evaluating the benefit of a child.
Troppz and Coleman thus stand for flexibility in the imposition of
damages, and insist that the jury be allowed to ponder the intangible
benefits arising in a given case. The question presented to a jury in its-
effort to balance benefits against damages in an unwanted childbirth
may ultimately resolve into an analysis of motive. If the parents de-
cided to limit the size of their family for financial reasons, or because
a child would alter their life-style-as in the case of middle-aged parents
whose other children had grown to maturity-then there has in fact
17. Note 10 supra.
18. 281 A.2d 616 (Del. Super. 1971).
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been substantial injury notwithstanding the fact that the parents love
and cherish the newborn infant. Thus, in the above instance, application
of the Troppi rule is superior to the economic analysis of Custodio in
that economic damages may be reduced by the showing of a family
benefit from the birth of a child. Similarly, Troppi is superior to the
total benefit theory of Shaheen in that it does allow recovery if dam-
ages are shown to outweigh benefits.
Conversely, if the motive for seeking birth control is fear for the
mother's health or fear of the possibility of serious complications of
pregnancy resultmg in possible congenital abnormality, then the normal
birth of a healthy child causes no long-standing economic injury In
this case the benefits of parenthood may well outweigh the anxieties
of pregnancy, yielding a net damage recovery of zero. Again, applica-
tion of the Troppi rule is superior to the totally economic analysis of
Custodio. Under the Custodio view, plaintiffs in such a situation would
be entitled to recover for all future expenditures even though their sole
motive in seeking birth control was the physical well-being of the
mother, and the birth has caused her no harm. Moreover, the benefit
oriented view in Shaheen would fail to appreciate the psychological dis-
comfort caused by the nine months of anxiety concerning the outcome
of the pregnancy
The flexibility inherent in the Troppz-Coleman approach to this dam-
age question is of particular value when the identity of the parents
becomes an element of the damage suffered. The unmarried woman
who finds herself pregnant may realize no benefit from the birth
of a child. But the approach of Custodio, compensation in economic
terms, does not seem to satisfy the psychological injury the experience
may well cause. Such a case would seem to require that the jury con-
sider, not the benefits from the parenthood which go in diminution of
damages, but the additional intangible elements of injury which actually
increase the recoverable damage. :9
The recognition that unwanted pregnancy may result in intangible
burdens is merely the converse of the acknowledgement that it may
19. Particularly m the context of a suit by an unwed mother, the question of
mitigation of damages, i.e. placing the child for adoption, may arise. While there is
no authority on the mitigation issue m tis particular area, it seems unlikely that courts
can impose a duty to give up unwanted children, even where the plaintiff is unmarried.
The decision seems to be within the exclusive province of the parents, and no general
rule could possibly cover the myriad of situations under which the decision to place
2 child for adoption might be made.
1972]
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result in intangible benefits. Thus it is the Troppi-Coleman approach
which seems best suited to weigh these various factors as they arise.
If the submission of the damage issue to the jury illustrates a judicial
conformance with a previous or coincident shift in social perception of
the ethics of family planning, the question of how well the plaintiff-
parents fare with the jury remains unsettled. The only reported case
illustrating a jury verdict in an unwanted child situation is Ball v.
Mudge,20 decided in 1964. There a jury determined, and an appellate
court affirmed that the plaintiff-parents suffered no damage from the
birth of a normal child.
Under the Troppi analysis of benefits, it may well be that the Ball
jury would award damages where the controlling facts are sufficiently
compelling, as in the case of the unwed mother. It is conceivable that a
jury finding that benefits outweigh injury is now capable of being re-
versed as clearly erroneous. If this is so, then the Troppi court has in-
deed reversed the roles of court and public perception. For now the
courts will have power to insist that standard rules of law regarding
malpractice, and legal concepts of benefit and burden resulting from
wrongful conduct, be applied in birth control cases. That power will
prohibit the imposition of social perceptions which do not coincide with
legal principles, and should lead to frequent success for plaintiffs seek-
Ing compensation for unwanted births.
ROBERT L. WINIKOFF
Trial Procedure-BOMBSHELL INSTRUCTION FOR DEADLOCKED JURIES:
ABA STANDARD REPLACES Allen CHARGE IN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
Unted States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
In the past, trial judges employed various devices in order to prod a
deadlocked jury into reaching a verdict.' However, the feasibility of
20. 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
1. By the ancient common law, jurors were kept together as prisoners of the
court until they had agreed upon their verdict. [This required that they
be] [K]ept without meat, drink, fire, or candle, unless by permission of the
judge, till they are all unanimously agreed.
People v. Sheldon, 156 N.Y. 268, 275, 50 N.E. 840, 842 (1898)
The reasons commonly given for such action are that a hung jury results in consider-
able loss of tine and money, and represents a failure of the jury system. Comment,
Defusing the Dynanmte Charge: A Critique of Allen and its Progeny, 36 TENN. L. REv.
749 (1969). See Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 946 (1963); A.MEuaAc BAR AssocAToN, STANDAns
RELATING TO TRaiL BY JuRy 154 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDAs].
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